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CARLOS GONZ´ ALEZ PIMIENTA†
Abstract. This paper shows that the set of probability distributions over
networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed
by Myerson (1991) is ﬁnite for a generic assignment of payoﬀs to networks.
The same result can be extended to several variations of the game found in
the literature.
1. Introduction
A basic tool in applying noncooperative game theory is to have a ﬁnite set of
probability distributions on outcomes derived from equilibria.
1 When utilities are
deﬁned over the relevant outcome space, it is well know that this is generically the
case when we can assign a diﬀerent outcome to each pure strategy proﬁle (Harsanyi,
1973), or to each ending node of an extensive form game (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
2
A game form endows players with ﬁnite strategy sets and speciﬁes which is the
outcome that arises from each pure strategy proﬁle.
3 It could identify, for instance,
two ending nodes in an extensive game form with the same outcome. Govindan
and McLennan (2001) give an example of a game form such that, in an open set
of utilities over outcomes, produces inﬁnitely many equilibrium distributions on
outcomes. In view of such a negative result, we have to turn to speciﬁc classes of
games to seek for positive results regarding the generic determinacy of the Nash
equilibrium concept. For some examples, see Park (1997) for sender-receiver games,
and De Sinopoli (2001), De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2005) for voting games.
This paper studies the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept
when individual payoﬀs depend on the network connecting them. The network
literature has been fruitful to describe social and economic interaction. See for
instance Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson and Watts (2002), Kranton and
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1By outcomes we mean the set of physical or economic outcomes of the game (i.e. the set
of diﬀerent economic alternatives that can be found after the game is played) and not the set of
probability distribution induced by equilibria. We will refer to the latter concept as the set of
equilibrium distributions.
2Harsanyi (1973) actually proves that the set of Nash equilibria is ﬁnite for a generic assignment
of payoﬀs to pure strategy proﬁles.
3More generally, it speciﬁes a probability distribution on the set of outcomes. Game forms are
formally deﬁned in Section 2.2
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Minehart (2001), or Calvo-Armengol (2004). It is, therefore, important to have
theories about how such networks form. Diﬀerent network formation procedures
have been proposed. For a comprehensive survey of those theories the reader is
referred to Jackson (2003).
The current paper is concerned with a noncooperative approach to network for-
mation. Perhaps the ﬁrst paper that follows this same line of reseach is Calvo-
Armengol and ˙ Ilkilic (2007). We focus on the network formation game proposed
by Myerson (1991). It can be described as follows: each player simultaneously
proposes a list of players with whom she wants to form a link, and a direct link
between two players is formed if and only if both players agree on that. This game
is simple and intuitive, however, since it takes two players to form a link, a co-
ordination problem arises which makes the game exhibit multiplicity of equilibria.
Nevertheless, we can prove that even though a network formation game may have
a large number of equilibria, every probability distribution on networks induced by
equilibria is generically isolated.
The network formation game is formally presented in the next section. Section
3 discusses an example. Section 4 contains the main result and its proof. To con-
clude, Section 5 discusses some extensions of the result to other network formation
games as well as a related result for the extensive form game of network formation
introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1989).
2. Preliminaries
Given a ﬁnite set A, denote as P(A) the power set of A, and as ∆(A) the set of
probability distributions on A.
2.1. Networks. Given a set of players N, a network g is a collection of direct
links. A direct link in the network g between two diﬀerent players i and j is
denoted by ij ∈ g. For the time being we focus on undirected networks. In an
undirected network ij ∈ g is equivalent to ji ∈ g.4 The set of i’s direct links in g is
Li(g) = {jk ∈ g : j = i or k = i}.
The complete network gN is such that Li(gN) = {ij : j  = i}, for all i ∈ N.
In gN player i is directly linked to every other player. The set of all undirected
networks on N is G = P(gN).
Each player i can be directly linked with N − 1 other players. The number of
links in the complete network gN is N(N − 1)/2, dividing by 2 not to count links
twice. Since G is the power set of gN, it has 2N(N−1)/2 elements.
2.2. Game forms. A game form is given by a set of players N = {1,...,n},
nonempty ﬁnite sets of pure strategies S1,...,Sn, a ﬁnite set of outcomes Ω, a
function θ: S → ∆(Ω), and utilities deﬁned over the outcome space Ω, that is,





Utility functions u1,...,un over Ω induce utility functions v1,...,vn over S
according to u1 ◦ θ,...,un ◦ θ. Hence, every game form has associated its ﬁnite
normal form game.
4In a directed network, if i and j are two diﬀerent agents, the link ij is diﬀerent from the link
ji. This two links can be regarded as diﬀerent if, for instance, they explain which is the direction
of information, or which is the player who is sponsoring the link.3
2.3. The Network Formation Game. The following network formation game is
due to Myerson (1991). The set of players is N. All players in N simultaneously
announce the set of direct links they wish to form. Formally, the set of player i’s
pure strategies is Si = P(N \ {i}). Therefore, a strategy si ∈ Si is a subset of
N \ {i} and is interpreted as the set of players other than i with whom player i
wishes to form a link. Mutual consent is needed to create a direct link, i.e., if s is
played, ij is created if and only if j ∈ si and i ∈ sj.
We can adapt the previous general description of game forms to the present
context in order to specify the game form that structures the network formation
game. Let the set of players and the collection of pure strategy sets be as above.
The set of outcomes is the set of undirected networks, i.e., Ω = G. The function
θ is a deterministic outcome function, formally, θ: S → G. Given a pure strategy
proﬁle, θ speciﬁes which network is formed respecting the rule of mutual consent
to create direct links. Utilities are functions u1,...,un: G → R. Once the set of
players N is given, the pure strategy sets are automatically created and the network




If players other than i play according to s−i ∈ S−i,5 the utility to player i from
playing strategy si is equal to vi(si,s−i) = ui(θ(si,s−i)).
Let Σi = ∆(Si) be the set of mixed strategies of player i. Furthermore, let
Σ = Σ1 ×     × Σn. While a pure strategy proﬁle s results in the network θ(s)
with certainty, a mixed strategy proﬁle σ generates a probability distribution on G,
where the probability that g ∈ G forms equals









If players other than i play according to σ−i in Σ−i,6 the utility to player i from
playing the mixed strategy σi is equal to Vi(σi,σ−i) =
 
g∈G P P P(g | (σi,σ−i))ui(g).
Deﬁnition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). The strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium
of the network formation game if Vi(σi,σ−i) ≥ Vi(σ′
i,σ−i) for all σ′
i in Σi, and for
all i in N.
2.4. Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Distributions in Game Forms. Let
us ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of a generic set.
Deﬁnition 2. For any m ≥ 0, we say that G ⊂ Rm is a generic set, or generic, if
Rm \ int(G) has Lebesgue measure 0.
Govindan and McLennan (2001) give an example of a game form that, in an open
set of utilities over outcomes, produces inﬁnitely many equilibrium distributions on
the outcome space.7 Nevertheless, they also provide a number of positive results.
Consider the general speciﬁcation of game forms given in Section 2.2. The following
theorem is a slight modiﬁcation of Theorem 5.3 in Govindan and McLennan (2001).
Theorem 1. If θ is such that at all completely mixed strategy tuples and for each







7Their counterexample needs at least three players. In a recent paper, Kukushkin et al. (2007)
provide a counterexample for the two player case.4
is (|Si|−1)-dimensional, then for generic utilities there are ﬁnitely many completely
mixed equilibria.
To maintain the paper self-contained, the proof of Theorem 1 is oﬀered in the
appendix.
3. An Example
Consider a 3 person network formation game. The corresponding game form is
depicted in Figure 1. Player 1 is the row player, player 2 the column player, and
player 3 the matrix player. The symbol g0 denotes the empty network, gN denotes
the complete network, gij denotes the network that only contains link ij, and gi
denotes the network where player i is connected to every other player and such that
there are no further links.8
{∅} {1} {3} {1,3} {∅} {1} {3} {1,3}
{∅} g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0 g0
{2} g0 g12 g0 g12 g0 g12 g0 g12
{3} g0 g0 g0 g0 g13 g13 g13 g13
{2,3} g0 g12 g0 g12 g13 g1 g13 g1
{∅} {1}
{∅} g0 g0 g23 g23 g0 g0 g23 g23
{2} g0 g12 g23 g2 g0 g12 g23 g2
{3} g0 g0 g23 g23 g13 g13 g3 g3
{2,3} g0 g12 g23 g2 g13 g1 g3 gN
{2} {1,2}
Figure 1. The game form of a network formation game with three players.
Suppose that the utility function of player i = 1,2 is ui(g) = |Li(g)|, i.e. player
i = 1,2 derives an utility from network g equal to the number of direct links that
she maintains in g. Suppose also that player 3 has the same utility as players 1 and
2, except that she derives an utility equal to 2 from network g2. Speciﬁcally,
ui(g
0) = 0 for all i,
ui(gjk) =
 






2 if i = j
2 if i = 3 and j = 2
1 otherwise,
gi(gN) = 2 for all i.
8This network architecture is often referred to as a star, see Bala and Goyal (2000)5
Figure 2 displays the set of Nash equilibria of this game. The subset of Nash
equilibria of line (i) supports the empty network, the subsets of line (ii) support,
respectively, networks g12, g13 and g23, the subsets of line (iii) support, respectively,








   
({3},{∅},{1})






   
({2},{1,3},{2})





({2,3},{1,3},λ{2}+ (1 − λ){1,2}) : λ ∈ [0,1]
 
. (iv)
Figure 2. Set of Nash equilibria of the 3 person network forma-
tion game discussed in Section 3.
The subset of equilibria of line (iv) induces a continuum of probability distribu-
tion over the set of networks that give probability λ to network g2and probability
(1 − λ) to the complete network gN for λ ∈ [0,1].
Now perturb independently the utility that each player obtains from each net-
work. The subsets of strategy proﬁles of lines (i) through (iii) are still equilibrium
strategy proﬁles. In addition, there are two possibilities:
• Player 3 ranks the complete network gN over network g2. In this case the





which supports the complete network.
• Player 3 ranks network g2 over the complet nerwork gN. Then, no Nash
equilibrium gives positive probability to the complete network. The set of
Nash equilibria is composed of lines (i) through (iii) united to
 
(λ{2} + (1 − λ){2,3},{1,3},{2}) : λ ∈ [0,1)
 
,
which supports network g2.
In either case, there is a ﬁnite number of probability distributions on networks
induced by equilibria.
4. The Result
Proposition. For generic u ∈
 
RG N
the set of probability distributions on net-
works induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game is ﬁnite.
Proof. Given a network formation game, there are a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent
normal form games obtained by assigning to each player i an element of P(Si) as
her strategy set.
Let T = T1 ×     × Tn, where Ti ⊆ Si. The normal form game ΓT is deﬁned by
the set of players N, the collection of strategy sets {Ti}i∈N, and the collection of6
utility functions {vT
i }i∈N, where vT
i is the restriction of vi to T. Furthermore, let
GT = θ(T).
It is enough to prove that for a generic assignment of payoﬀs to networks, com-
pletely mixed Nash equilibria of each of those games induce a ﬁnite set of probability
distributions on G. Notice that every equilibrium of any game can be obtained as a
completely mixed equilibrium of the modiﬁed game obtained by eliminating unused
strategies.
Consider the game ΓT. If there exists a strategy ti ∈ Ti with j ∈ ti and there
does not exist a strategy tj ∈ Tj such that i ∈ tj, replace strategy ti with t′
i =
ti \ {j} in case t′
i is not already contained in Ti, otherwise just eliminate strategy
ti from Ti. Notice that by making this change, the set of probability distributions
on GT that can be obtained through mixed strategies remains unaltered. Most
importantly, for every completely mixed Nash equilibrium of ΓT, there exists a
completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the modiﬁed game that induces the same
probability distribution on GT.
Repeat the same procedure with t′
i: if there exists a k ∈ t′
i and there does not
exist a strategy tk in Tk with i ∈ tk substitute t′
i for t′′
i = t′
i \ {k} in case t′′
i is not
already contained in Tk. Continue eliminating and replacing pure strategies in the
same vein, for every ti in Ti and for every i in N, until every link proposal that
any player has in some on her strategies is formed with positive probability under
a completely mixed strategy proﬁle. Let ˆ T denote the resulting set of pure strategy
proﬁles, and notice that G ˆ T = GT.
At every completely mixed strategy proﬁle σ of Γ ˆ T, every network in GT receives
positive probability. At the strategy proﬁle (ti,σ−i), only those networks g ∈ GT
such that {ij : j ∈ ti} ⊂ g receive positive probability, and since for every player i




(  | σ) = |ˆ Ti| − 1.
Therefore, at every completely mixed strategy proﬁle of Γ ˆ T the set probability
distributions on GT that player i can induce by varying her strategy is (|ˆ Ti| − 1)-
dimensional. We can apply Theorem 1 to the game form given by ˆ T and θ ˆ T, the
restriction of θ to ˆ T. This implies that for generic utilities over GT there are ﬁnitely
many completely mixed equilibria of Γ ˆ T, which in turn implies that the set of
probability distributions on GT induced by completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓT
is generically ﬁnite.













, i.e., the closure of the set of payoﬀs over GT such that the
set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓT induces inﬁnitely many probability
distributions on GT, then for any closed set H in
 
RG\GT N
the closed set K × H
has zero measure in
 
RG N
. The same is true for any other T ′ ⊆ S. This concludes
the proof. ￿
5. Remarks
5.1. Absence of Mutual Consent. Models of network formation can be found
in the literature that do not require common agreement between the parties to
create a direct link, see for instance Bala and Goyal (2000). Thus, suppose that7
mutual consent is not needed to create a direct link. Let N be the set of players,
let S1,...,Sn be the collection of pure strategy sets, where Si = P(N \{i}) for all
i in N, and let G be the outcome space. In the model analyzed in Section 4, a link
may not be created even if a player wants it to be created. In the current model,
a link may be created even if a player does not want it to be created.
In this modiﬁed network formation game, generically, the set of equilibrium
distributions on G is also ﬁnite. Notice that we can reinterpret pure strategies
si ∈ Si as the set of players other that i with whom player i does not want to form
a link. The link ij is not created only if player i does not want to be linked with
player j and player j does not want to be linked with player i. Deﬁne θ′ : S → G
according to θ′(s) = gN \ θ(s), where θ is the one deﬁned in Section 2.3. Now,
apply the proof of Section 4.
5.2. Directed Networks. Sometimes links ij and ji cannot be treated as equiva-
lent for reasons coming from the nature of the phenomena being modeled. Directed
networks respond to this necessity, for an example see again Bala and Goyal (2000).
Denote the set of directed networks as Gd. Suppose ﬁrst that link formation does
not need mutual consent. The strategy set of player i is Si = P(N\{i}). A strategy
si ∈ Si is interpreted as the set of players other than i with whom player i wants to
start an arrowhead link pointing at herself, i.e. the set of links that player i wishes
to receive.9
Notice that each pure strategy proﬁle leads to a diﬀerent element in Gd: each
player has 2N−1 pure strategies, and there are 2N(N−1) undirected networks. There-
fore, we are in the case of normal form payoﬀs where the generic ﬁniteness of equi-
libria is guaranteed.
Suppose now that if a player i wants to receive a link from player j, player j
needs to declare that she wants to send a link to player i for it to be created. To
accommodate for this case, let the strategy set of player i be Si = Sr
i × Ss
i =




i as the set of players other than i from whom player i wishes to receive
a link, and ss
i as the set of players other than i to whom player i wishes to send a
link. Suppose that the pure strategy proﬁle s is played. The link ij is created only
if j ∈ sr
i and i ∈ ss
j.
A similar proof to the one used in Section 4 establishes the generic determinacy
of the Nash equilibrium concept under this setting. The key step that we must
change is the following: Let T = T1 ×     × Tn where Ti ⊂ Si for all i. Consider
the normal form game ΓT. If there exists a strategy ti ∈ Ti such that j ∈ tr
i (such
that j ∈ ts
i) and there does not exist a strategy tj ∈ Tj such that i ∈ ts
j (such that
i ∈ tr






i \ {j})). Finally,
repeat the same procedure for every ti,t′
i,... and for every i until the hypothesis
of Theorem 1 holds.
5.3. A Extensive Form Game of Network Formation. We have focused on
normal form games of network formation. However, there exists a prominent ex-
tensive game of network formation due to Aumann and Myerson (1989). They
proposed the ﬁrst explicit formalization of network formation as a game. It relies
9We can assume, for instance, that the arrowhead tells which is the direction of the ﬂow of
information.8
on an exogenously given order over possible links. Let (i1j1,...,imjm) be such a
ranking.
The game has m stages. In the ﬁrst stage players i1 and j1 play a simultaneous
move game to decide whether or not they form link i1j1. Each of them chooses an
action from the set {yes,not}. The link i1j1 is established if and only if both players
choose yes. Once the decision on link i1j1 is taken, every player gets informed about
it, and the play of the game moves to the decision about link i2j2. The game evolves
in the same fashion, and ﬁnishes with the stage where players im and jm decide
upon link imjm.10 The resulting network is formed by the set links ikjk such that
both players ik and jk chose yes at stage k. Although in the argument we work
with undirected networks, the game can be applied to the formation of directed
networks.
The argument that follows is a modiﬁcation of the one used by Govindan and
McLennan (2001) to prove that, for a given assignment of outcomes to ending nodes
in an extensive game of perfect information, and for utilities such that no player is
indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent outcomes, every Nash equilibrium induces a de-
generate probability distribution in the set of outcomes. Such an argument is, in
turn, a generalization of the one used by Kuhn (1953) to prove his “backwards in-
duction” theorem that characterizes subgame perfect equilibria for games of perfect
information.






: ui(g1)  = ui(g2) for all i ∈ N and all g1,g2 ∈ G
 
.
The claim is that if the utility vector is u ∈ UG, every Nash equilibrium induces
a probability distribution on G that assigns probability one to some g ∈ G.
Let Si denote the set of pure strategies of player i, where now a pure strategy is
a function that assigns one element of {yes,not} to each information set of player
i. As usual, Σi = ∆(Si) and Σ = Σ1 ×     × Σn.
Let σ ∈ Σ be a Nash equilibrium for u ∈ UG. The appropriate modiﬁcation
of σ, say ¯ σ, is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the extensive form game
obtained by eliminating all information sets and branches that occur with zero
probability in case σ is played. In this reduced game, every information set has
a well deﬁned conditional probability over networks and, obviously, ¯ σ induces the
same probability distribution on G as σ.
If there is a stage where a player randomizes between yes and not and the other
player does chooses yes with positive probability 1, there must be a last such stage.
But at this last stage, say ihjh, such an agent, say ih, cannot be optimizing, since
she is not indiﬀerent between g \ {ihjh} and g ∪ {ihjh} for any g ∈ G.
We can adapt the previous argument to the case where mutual consent is not
needed to create a link. Let (i1j1,...,imjm) be an oder of links. At stage k,
player ik decides whether or not to create link ikjk. Her decision becomes publicly
10If players get informed about which has been the terminal position in the simultaneous move
game of every stage, the same argument oﬀered below also goes through.
Several features can be added to this basic model. For instance, two players can be called to
reconsider their decision in case some set of links is formed, or two player may not be allowed
to decide upon the link connecting them. At this respect, if players are forming an undirected
network, m can be diﬀerent from 2
N(N−1)
2 .9
known. It is, consequently, a game of perfect information and the argument given
by Govindan and McLennan (2001) covers this case.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
The current proof is based on the one oﬀered by Govindan and McLennan (2001).
It uses some concepts and results of semi-algebraic theory that we will now revise.
Expositions of semi-algebraic geometry in the economic literature occur in Blume
and Zame (1994), Schanuel et al. (1991) and Govindan and McLennan (2001).
Proofs of major results are omitted.
Deﬁnition 3. A set A is semi-algebraic if it is the ﬁnite union of sets of the form
 
x ∈ Rm : P(x) = 0 and Q1(x) > 0 and...and Qk(x) > 0
 
where P and Q1,...,Qk are polynomials in x1,...,xm with real coeﬃcients. A
function (or correspondence) g : A → B with semi-algebraic domain A ⊂ Rn and
range B ⊂ Rm is semi-algebraic if its graph is a semi-algebraic subset of Rn+m.
Each semi-algebraic set is the ﬁnite union of connected components. Each
component is a semi-algebraic manifold of a given dimension. A d-dimensional
semi-algebraic manifold in Rm is a semi-algebraic set M ⊂ Rm such that for each
p ∈ M there exist polynomials P1,...,Pm−d and U, a neighborhood of p, such that
DP1(p),...,DPm−d(p) are linearly independent and
M ∩ U =
 
q ∈ U : P1(q) = ... = Pm−d(q) = 0
 
.
Theorem 2 (Stratiﬁcation, Whitney (1957)). If A is a semi-algebraic set, then A
is the union of a ﬁnite number of disjoint, connected semi-algebraic manifolds Aj
with Aj ⊂ cl(Ak) whenever Aj ∩ cl(Ak)  = ∅.
Henceforth, the superscript of a set indexes components of a decomposition as
per Theorem 2, while a subscript keeps indexing strategy sets by players. Theorem
2 has important consequences. Among those, we will use the following intuitive
ones: Let A ⊂ Rm and B ⊂ Rn be semi-algebraic sets, then
• the dimension of A, dimA, is equal to the largest dimension of any element
of any stratiﬁcation,
• if A is 0-dimensional then A is ﬁnite,
• A is generic if and only if dim(Rm \ A) < m,
• dim(A × B) = dimA + dimB.
We need one additional result. While Theorem 2 decomposes semi-algebraic sets,
the following one decomposes semi-algebraic functions.
Theorem 3 (Generic Local Triviality, Hardt (1980)). Let A and B be semi alge-
braic sets, and let g: A → B be a continuous semi-algebraic function. Then there
is a relatively closed semi-algebraic set B′ ⊂ B with dimB′ < dimB such that each
component Bj of B \ B′ has the following property: there is a semi algebraic set
Fj and a semi-algebraic homeomorphism h: Bj × Fj → Aj, where Aj = g−1(Bj),
with g(h(b,f)) = b for all (b,f) ∈ Bj × Fj.
We can now proceed to prove Theorem 1. Recall that at every completely mixed
strategy σ ∈ Σ, the set of probability distributions on outcomes that player i can
induce by varying her strategy is (|Si| − 1)-dimensional.10
Proof of Theorem 1. Let A = {(σ,u) : σ is a completely mixed equilibrium for u}.
Let πΣ be the projection of A onto Σ. Apply Theorem 3 to πΣ and choose Σj such
that dimAj = dimA.11 We have that dimA = dimΣj +dimFj ≤ dimΣ+dimFj.
Let σ belong to Σj, then dimπ
−1
Σ (σ) = dim{σ} + dimFj = dimFj. Now consider
a given u, the set {˜ ui ∈ Ui : σ is a completely mixed equilibrium for (˜ ui,u−i)} is
(dimUi − (|Si| − 1))-dimensional. Consequently, the dimension of π
−1
Σ (σ) and Fj
is equal to dimU − dimΣ, which implies that dimA ≤ dimU.
Now apply Theorem 3 to πU, the projection of A onto U. Choose Uj to be of
the same dimension as U. Therefore, dimAj = dimU + dimπ
−1
U (u). This implies
that dimπ
−1
U (u) ≤ dimA−dimU ≤ 0, i.e. there is a ﬁnite set of completely mixed
equilibria whenever u belongs to a full dimensional Uj. This concludes the proof
since lower dimensional Uj’s are nongeneric. ￿
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